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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Douglas McBride, timely appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction, wherein the district court adjudged Mr. McBride guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance. Prior to the entry of judgment, Mr. McBride filed a motion to 
suppress evidence and argued that the impoundment of his vehicle was an illegal 
seizure. Additionally, he argued that the ensuing inventory search of his vehicle was 
illegal. In denying his suppression motion, the district court found that both the seizure 
and search of his vehicle were justified under the inventory exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement. Mr. McBride then entered a conditional guilty plea, 
reserving his right to appeal the suppression issues. 
On appeal, Mr. McBride asserts that the district court erred in denying his 
suppression motion. Specifically, he argues that the impoundment of his vehicle was an 
unlawful seizure because the local police department's impoundment policy provides 
officer's unfettered discretion when determining which vehicles will be impounded. He 
also contends that the "inventory" search of his vehicle was unlawful because there is 
no department policy which governs an inventory search. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. McBride was driving Melissa Watson in his mother's car when he was 
pulled over by Police Officer Miller, who was investigating a domestic dispute. 1 
(02/12/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-15; 02/12/10 Tr., p.15, L.6 - p.16, L.11; 06/01/10 Tr., p.11, 
L.19-p.12, L.15; 06/01/10 Tr., p.6, L.11 -p.7, L.10.) At the time Mr. McBride's vehicle 
1 For the purposes of this brief, the car will be referred to as Mr. McBride's vehicle. 
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was pulled over, it was located on an onramp to an interstate highway. (02/12/10 
Tr., p .12, Ls. 1-6.) 
Officer Miller had Mr. McBride exit the vehicle to discuss the alleged domestic 
dispute. (06/01/10Tr., p.6, L.17 p.7, L.10; 02/12/10Tr., p.22, Ls.10-17.) Officer Miller 
first spoke with Ms. Watson and then spoke with Mr. McBride. (06/12/10 Tr., p.7, L.8 -
p.9, L.20.) During this conversation, Officer Miller thought Mr. McBride was acting 
unusual and suspected he was under the influence of a controlled substance. (02/12/10 
Tr., p.16, Ls.16-23; 06/01/10 Tr., p.9, L.16 - p.10, L.6.) Mr. McBride was eventually 
taken into police custody for driving under the influence of a controlled substance. 
(06/01/10Tr., p.10, L.18-p11, L.6; 02/12/10Tr., p.17, Ls.12-13.) 
After placing Mr. McBride under arrest, Officer Miller called Mr. McBride's 
mother. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.19-21.) During that conversation, Officer Miller 
discovered that she owned the vehicle and he then asked Mr. Miller's mother for 
permission to search the vehicle because he thought it contained drugs. (06/01/10 
Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.5.) Mr. McBride's mother told the officer he could not search 
the vehicle. (06/01/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.21-23.) She also told Officer Miller that she did not 
want the vehicle impounded because he might find drugs and she could not afford 
impound fees. (06/01/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.1.) She also told Officer Miller that 
she could be there to pick up the vehicle in approximately one-half hour. (06/01/10 
Tr., p.26, Ls.3-16.) 
Officer Miller then decided to have the vehicle impounded. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.1 - p.18.) Before the vehicle was impounded, he performed an "inventory" search. 
(02/12/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-20.) During this search, Officer Miller located a purse, 
opened the purse, and found several syringes. (02/12/10 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.11.) 
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He also found a stuffed animal with a zipper on its backside. (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.3-
12.) Officer Miller then unzipped the backside of the stuffed animal and found syringes. 
(02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14.) 
The prosecutor charged Mr. McBride, by information, with two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance, driving under the influence of a controlled 
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual offender enhancement. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.39-40, 116-118.)2 Mr. McBride filed a motion to suppress. (R., Vol. I., 
pp.3535-36, 43-50.) A suppression hearing was held and the State introduced, as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a copy of the Kootenai County's lmpoundment policy, which is 
entitled Special Order #90A. (06/01/10 Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14, L.10.) At the conclusion 
of that hearing, the district court allowed the parties to file supplemental briefing to 
address issues which were not included in the original suppression motion. (06/01/10 
Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.33, L.22.) 
Mr. McBride then filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to 
suppress, wherein he argued that the Kootenai County's impoundment policy was 
unreasonable, as it provides police officers with unfettered discretion to decide whether 
to have a vehicle impounded. (R., Vol. 11., pp.11-24.) The Kootenai County 
impoundment policy entitled Special Order #90A follows: 
It is the policy of the Operations Bureau to tow a vehicle whenever the 
driver is taken into custody. At the deputy's discretion, a competent driver 
may be located in cases where: 
1. There is excessive property in the vehicle, making a 
complete inventory cumbersome and time consuming; 
2. There are children involved; 
2 There are two clerk's records which were submitted in separate volumes. However, 
they were not assigned separate volume numbers. The brief will reference the 230-
page clerk's record as Volume I and the 77-page clerk's record as Volume II. 
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3. Pets, valuable property or materials which need immediate 
care, i.e. frozen foods, hazardous materials, etc., are in the 
vehicle; or 
4. At the discretion of the deputy with regards to other 
circumstances at the scene. 
Operations Bureau WILL NOT lock and park any vehicle then leave it 
along side of the road or public parking area. Nor will personnel get into 
the vehicle and then move it 
Every time we allow a vehicle to sit at a location after an arrest, we incur a 
measure of liability for any damage of theft. The same holds true when a 
deputy moves or drives the vehicle themselves. 
Beginning immediately, we will release only to those people who are 
selected by the owner/operator, possess a valid driver's license, and have 
been identified and included in the report. All other vehicles will be towed. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (original emphasis). 
In his suppression motion, Mr. McBride also argued that Officer Miller's search of 
his vehicle was unreasonable because Kootenai County has no general policy setting 
forth the requirements governing inventory searches and no specific policy governing 
closed containers which are discovered during an inventory search. (R., Vol. II, pp.11-
24.) Thereafter, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R., Vol. I, pp.120-145.) 
Mr. McBride then entered into a conditional plea agreement, which preserved his 
ability to appeal the district court's order denying his suppression motion. (12/30/10 
Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25; R., Vol. I, pp.215-216.)3 Pursuant to the plea agreement, 
Mr. McBride pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence and 
a felony charge of possession of a controlled substance. (12/30.10 Tr., p.6, L.19- p.7, 
L.8.) In return, the State agreed to dismiss one count of possession of a controlled 
4 
substance and possession of paraphernalia, and the habitual offender enhancement. 
(12/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-24.) Thereafter, the district court entered its judgment of 
conviction and imposed upon Mr. McBride a unified sentence of seven years, with five 
years fixed, but retained its jurisdiction. (R., Vol. I., pp.221-223.) Mr. McBride timely 
appealed. (03/17 /11 Notice of Appeal, pp.1-4.)4 
3 Mr. McBride filed various pro se motions. (R., Vol., I, pp.148, 155-167, 195-200.) 
However, the issues contained in those motions were not preserved in the conditional 
~uilty plea. (R., Vol. I, pp.215-216.) 
Mr. McBride subsequently filed various motions and amended notices of appeal. 




Did the district court err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered through a 
warrantless search of Mr. McBride's vehicle?5 
5 There were various issues addressed in the briefing in support of Mr. McBride's 
suppression motion. However, only the issue pertaining to tl1e validity of the 
impoundment and subsequent search of his vehicle will be raised on appeal. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Refusing To Suppress Evidence Discovered Through A 
Warrantless Search Of Mr. McBride's Vehicle 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Mr. McBride's suppression motion based on the 
impoundment/inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. On appeal, Mr. McBride argues that a police officer's decision to impound 
and subsequently inventory the contents of a vehicle constitute two separate actions 
which are both subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment. Mr. McBride 
specifically argues that the State has failed to establish that Kootenai County's 
impoundment policy is constitutional, in light of the fact it affords an arresting officer with 
unfettered discretion to decide whether a vehicle will be impounded. 
Mr. McBride also argues that the State failed to establish that the inventory 
search of Mr. McBride's vehicle was constitutional because it never produced a 
procedure which governs the process of creating an inventory in Kootenai County, and 
a specific policy which controls the creation of an inventory in the context of closed 
containers. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the district court erred in finding that the 
impoundment/inventory search in this case comported with departmental policies and, 
thus, was constitutionally permissible, turns on an interpretation of the applicable police 
department policies (which are akin to statutes or, perhaps, contracts), and it is, 
therefore, subject to de nova review. See State v. Skur/ock, 150 Idaho 404, 405 (2011) 
("When this Court reviews a district court's order granting or denying a motion to 
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suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated .... The Court will accept the 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the 
trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found."). 'The 
interpretation of a statute is a legal question over which this Court exercises free 
review." State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 471, 476 (2011 ). "In determining the meaning of a 
contract, '[w]hen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous,' its meaning and 
legal effect are questions of law over which we exercise free review." Wattenbarger v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 315 (2010). 
C. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Justify The Seizure Of Mr. McBride's 
Vehicle Under Its lmpoundment Policy Because The Policy Provides An 
Arresting Officer With An Unreasonable Amount of Discretion When Determining 
Which Vehicles Will Be Impounded 
Mr. McBride has a liberty interest against unreasonable seizures which is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States' Constitution, which provides 
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Further, 
Mr. McBride has a similar liberty interest under Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the 
purpose of Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy 
against arbitrary governmental intrusion.") "A seizure without a warrant is per se 
unreasonable unless it falls within one of the limited exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment requirements." State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The "burden is on the government to show that a situation falls within one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-219 
( 1999) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971 )). It is the "State's 
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burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an exception to the warrant 
requirement applied." State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2001) (original 
emphasis). 
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is for so-called 
impoundment/inventory searches. See State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290-291 
(1995). The initial decision to impound a vehicle is a seizure must be lawful and "is thus 
subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 291. The Fourth 
Amendment requires that "an impoundment must be reasonable under all the 
circumstances known to the police when the decision to impound was made." Id. 
Further, it is reasonable to afford police officers "discretion in determining whether to 
impound a vehicle, provided that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria 
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity." Id. (citing to 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987)). In Bertine, the United States Supreme 
Court found appropriate, a standard set of police procedures which allowed an arresting 
officer to decide whether to impound a vehicle based on the feasibility and 
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-376. That 
policy specifically required the establishment of: 
[S]everal conditions ... before an officer may pursue the park-and-lock 
alternative. For example, police may not park and lock the vehicle where 
there is reasonable risk of damc1ge or vandalism to the vehicle or where 
the approval of the arrestee cannot be obtained. Not only do such 
conditions circumscribe the discretion of individual officers, but they also 
protect the vehicle and its contents and minimize claims of property loss. 
Id. at 375-376 n.7 (citation omitted). In other words, if a policy allows an officer to 
decide whether it will impound a vehicle, the officer's discretion must be limited by a set 
of standards which promote policies such as protecting personal property and protecting 
the police against false claims of property loss. The purpose of this limitation is to 
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prevent an officer from using the impoundment as a means to circumvent the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Turing to the impoundment policy in this matter, Mr. McBride argues that it is 
unconstitutional because it provides an arresting officer with an unreasonable amount of 
discretion to decide whether to impound a vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the 
State entered into evidence Kootenai County's Special Order #90A, which sets forth the 
standard procedures which govern an officer's decision to impound a vehicle. (06/01/10 
Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.14, L.1 O; Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) The relevant portions of the procedure 
follow: 
It is the policy of the Operations Bureau to tow a vehicle whenever the driver is 
taken into custody. At the deputy's discretion, a competent driver may be located 
in cases where: 
1. There is excessive property in the vehicle, making a complete 
inventory cumbersome and time consuming; 
4. At the discretion of the deputy with regards to other circumstances 
at the scene. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
The general Kootenai County policy requires the impoundment of all vehicles in 
instances where the driver of a vehicle is arrested. However, the problem with this 
procedure arises in the exceptions to that rule because they allow an officer to forego 
impoundment, based on the arresting officer's subjective belief that an inventory could 
be burdensome or for "other circumstances at the scene." Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The 
former exception provides an arresting officer with unlimited discretion in deciding 
whether to forego impoundment, which is based on the arresting officer's subjective 
belief that performing an inventory could be burdensome. In effect, this exception 
swallows the general rule and affords an arresting officer an unreasonable amount of 
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discretion when deciding whether to impound a vehicle. The second exception is even 
broader than the first, and allows an arresting officer to attempt to locate a competent 
driver as an alternative to impoundment, at "discretion of the deputy with regards to 
other circumstances at the scene." Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. The Kootenai County 
impoundment policy does not define or otherwise limit what would constitute "other 
circumstances." 
These exceptions fall short of a standard set of criteria required under the United 
States constitution. In fact, this is the very type of unfettered discretion which is 
prohibited under the Fourth Amendment because it enables arresting officers to make 
ad hoc decisions to impound vehicles. Weaver, at 291. Due to this broad range of 
discretion, and lack of predetermined criteria to temper that discretion, there is nothing 
which prevents an officer's decision to impound from being based on the suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
Since Kootenai County's impoundment policy provided Officer IVliller with 
unfettered discretion, there is no way to determine whether his decision to impound 
Mr. McBride's vehicle was based on a community caretaker function or merely a ruse to 
circumvent the warrant requirement. In fact, Mr. McBride's mother spoke with Officer 
Miller before he made the decision to impound the vehicle, and told him that she was 
the owner of the vehicle, she did not want the vehicle towed, and she could pick it up in 
one-half hour. (06/01/10 Tr., p.24, L.17 - p.26, L.10.) Officer Miller's intentions can be 
placed into question because he asked Mr. McBride's mother if he could search the car 
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because he thought there were drugs in the vehicle. 6 (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, L.24- p.12, 
L.5.) 
In sum, the decision to impound Mr. McBride's vehicle constituted an illegal 
seizure because the Kootenai County impoundment policy contains two exceptions 
which provide an arresting officer an impermissible amount of discretion when deciding 
whether to impound a vehicle. Due to that infirmity, the initial seizure of Mr. McBride's 
vehicle was illegal and the subsequent search is imputed with the same taint and 
therefore, must be suppressed. Weaver, 127, Idaho at 291. U.S. Const. amend IV. 
D. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Establish That The Search 
Mr. McBride's Vehicle Was A Valid Inventory Search 
The United States Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in 
"unreasonable searches" of any person. U.S. Const. amend IV. It is now well-
established that '"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate,"' i.e., warrantless searches, "'are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions."' Arizona v.Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1716 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); accord State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). 
It is the government's burden to "demonstrate that the search fell within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances.'' Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290. 
6 Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that Officer Miller asked 
Ms. Watson if she had a driver's license and if she wanted to drive the car prior to the 
impoundment and subsequent inventory search. Further, Officer Miller never asked 
Mr. McBride or his Mother if Ms. Watson could take possession of the car. These facts 
or lack of facts, provide further support for the conclusion that Officer Miller's decision to 
impound the car was merely a ruse to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. 
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One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is for so-called 
"inventory" searches. See id. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 
(1976), the United States Supreme Court approved of police departments' "community 
caretaking function" of removing automobiles from streets and highways to improve the 
flow of traffic and protect the public and held that, in certain circumstances, police can 
inventory the contents of the vehicles they impound in order to: (a) protect the owner's 
property from theft or vandalism, (b) immunize the police department from claims and 
disputes arising out of stolen or damaged property, and (c) protect individual police 
officers from dangerous items that may be inside impounded vehicles. Id. at 369, 372. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of how an officer 
may exercise his/her discretion when inventorying vehicles, in the specific context of a 
locked container discovered within an impounded vehicle. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 
2-3 (1990). In that case, the Court noted that an officer "may be allowed sufficient 
latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in 
light of the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container itself," but it 
went on to hold that the search is impermissible in the absence of a policy specifically 
addressing the opening of containers. Id. at 4-5. 
In State v. Owen, 143 Idaho 274, 277 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals approvingly cited to Wells for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment 
requires, "standardized criteria or established routine must specifically regulate the 
opening if closed containers found during an inventory search." The Court of Appeals 
went on to quote the following from Wells: 
Our view that standardized criteria ... or established routine ... must 
regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is 
based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a 
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy 
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or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce 
an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so much 
latitude that inventory searches are turned into a 'purposeful and general 
means of discovering evidence of crime.' 
Id. (quoting Wells 495 U.S. at 4 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375)); see also State v. 
Reimer, 127 Idaho 214, 219 (1995) ("To ensure that the purpose of an inventory search 
is genuine, the government must show that any inventory search was conducted with 
standardized criteria or established procedures."). In the event an inventory search is 
performed in the absence of a departmental policy, the Fourth Amendment is not 
satisfied and the remedy is suppression. Id. 
In Owen, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals was analyzing an unwritten inventory 
policy. Id. 277-278. The only evidence pertaining to this policy, was the testimony of 
two officers indicating that there was a general policy which required an inventory of 
"everything that was taken into police custody." Id. There was conflicting testimony over 
the existence of a policy which governed the opening of closed containers. Id. at 278. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that this evidence did not establish the existence of a 
standard policy which governed the process of inventorying closed containers in the 
context. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals ultimately held as follows: 
Similar to Wells, the officers here had authority to conduct an inventory 
search, but opened a locked container in the apparent absence of any 
department policy or criteria, written or unwritten, regarding opening such 
containers. Any suspicion the officers had that the safe contained 
contraband did not alleviate the necessity for the sheriff's department to 
either get a warrant or to establish, and its officers to follow, a 
standardized criteria for dealing with locked containers pursuant to the 
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. Therefore, we hold that the opening of the safe was not 
sufficiently regulated by department policy or standard criteria to satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying 
Owen's motion to suppress evidence found in the safe. 
Id. 278. 
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There is very little evidence in the record pertaining to a Kootenai County 
inventory policy. This evidence was elicited at the February 12, 2010, preliminary 
hearing during the testimony of Officer Miller, 7 which follows: 
Q. . .. Do you have a copy of a written Kootenai County Sherriff's 
Department Standard policy on an inventory? 
A. Not with me, no. 
Q. Do you know if one exists? 
A. There's a general order that states on uh, inventory searches of 
vehicles, when you tow a vehicle. 
Q. Okay, and what's your understanding of what it says? 
A. Uh, once a party has been arrested from the vehicle that a full 
inventory including locked compartments will be opened. Uh, all 
substances inside will be identified and secured in a manner uh, for 
the protection of the - - the driver of the vehicle and the officer on 
the street and then the vehicle will be towed. 
Q. And that's the same in every arrest. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Every arrest out of a vehicle gets an inventory search. 
A. Every arrest out of a vehicle. Um, there are exceptions to uh, 
impounding vehicles, but any time that we impound a vehicle it gets 
inventoried. 
Q. Okay. So what is your - - I - - And I guess maybe I asked the 
wrong question. What is the policy of the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
in regard to impounding vehicles? 
7 There is reference to an inventory search in the Kootenai County's Special Order #90 
A, where it states that an officer can forgo impoundment if there is "excessive property 
in the vehicle, making a complete inventory cumbersome and time consuming." 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) This does not qualify as an inventorying procedure. It is an 
impoundment procedure which states that impoundment is not necessary if creating an 
inventory will be cumbersome and time consuming. It does not provide any criteria 
which governs that actual process of inventorying a vehicle, let alone a specific policy, 
which governs closed containers. 
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A. Uh, generally, if a registered owner is not on scene or is unable to 
take control of the vehicle, then the vehicle is subsequently towed 
uh, especially if it contains items that are uh, of a nature that could 
be taken from the vehicle if it's left on the side of the road, that 
could be stolen, that kind of thing, um, then the - - the [vehicle is] 
inventoried and towed. 
(02/12/10 Tr., p.39, L.19-p.41, L.2.) 
It is not clear whether Officer Miller was discussing a separate inventory policy 
and a separate impoundment policy, or if he was only, and inaccurately, describing the 
Kootenai County impoundment policy Special Order #90 A. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Miller was asked why he decided to perform an inventory 
search, and Officer Miller provided various justifications for that decision, but none of 
them were based on a standard inventory search policy. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-18; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.) Concerning this point, Mr. McBride's trial counsel filed a 
supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to suppress8 and argued that 
Officer Miller's preliminary testimony was only referring to the impoundment policy 
Special Order #90 A, and that impoundment policy does not regulate the actual process 
of inventory searches generally, and there is no specific policy controlling closed 
containers. (R., Vol. II. pp. 20-23.) In response to this position, the State made no 
argument, or otherwise attempt to establish whether Officer Miller was discussing 
Special Order #90A or a separate inventory policy. (R., Vol. II. pp.41-42.) 
The only argument made by the State was that Officer Miller's testimony 
established that an inventory is taken after impoundment and that is a standard routine. 
(R., Vol. 11., pp.41-42.) However, the district court found that the State's argument was 
not responsive to Mr. McBride's, and, therefore, made an implicit factual finding that 
8 This memorandum was filed after the June 1, 2010, suppression hearing. (R., Vol. II., 
pp.11-24.) 
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there is no credible evidence supporting the existence a standardized policy governing 
inventory searches in the context of closed containers. (R., Vol. I. 143-144.) 
The State's failure to establish the existence of an inventory procedure at the trial 
level is critical because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the failure to present 
such evidence at the trial level bars the introduction of that evidence on appeal. 
Reimer, 127 Idaho at 218-219. The Supreme Court's specific language follows: 
No evidence was introduced before the district court to establish that the 
search was conducted in connection with any department policy and the 
argument was not preserved for appeal. Thus, while it is certainly possible 
that the State might have been able to assert the inventory exception 
successfully as a justification for the warrantless search before the district 
court, it did not do so. 
Id. Therefore, the State never met its burden by establishing the existence of a 
Kootenai County policy that is designed to produce an inventory and will be barred from 
doing so on appeal. 
However, the district court overlooked that State's failure to produce such 
evidence and its failure to address Mr. McBride's arguments when it denied 
Mr. McBride's suppression motion on the basis that the containers in this matter were 
not closed. (R., Vol. I. pp.143-145.) In coming to this conclusion, the district court 
stated: 
None of those cases [Wells, Owen, and Reimer] involve purse-type 
containers of the type in the instant matter. Where the purpose of 
inventorying contents is to protect property, protect the police against 
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and protect police from 
potential danger, the difference between safes, mugs, and locked 
suitcases, on the one hand, and 'several purse type-bags' is great. 
[Mr. McBride] does not allege the bags were locked or secured. And, the 
contents of a safe, a mug bottom which is 'sealed snugly and only comes 
off if pried with a strong with a strong finger nail or a flat object such as a 
coin or screwdriver' or a locked suitcase do not pose the possible risk to 
police that 'loose items of clothing, purses and handbags, larger bags, and 
toiletries' may pose. Nor is the risk of claims or disputes regarding 
missing or stolen items the same. 
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(R., Vol. I, pp.144-145 (citations omitted).) 
The applicable case law does not support the distinction identified by the district 
court. While the cases mentioned by the district court happened to be dealing with 
locked containers or containers which are difficult to open, none of the cases draw a 
distinction between closed containers which are locked and unlocked.9 These cases all 
concluded that specific policies must be provided that govern inventory searches 
generally, and even if there is a general policy, there must be a specific policy governing 
closed containers. Those cases do not hold that standard inventory policy is only 
needed when confronted with a locked container. In fact, this is the very type of issue 
preexisting procedures should address. For example, an appellate court in Florida held: 
In so holding, we do not believe that the use of a lock on a closed 
container is critical to the rationale of Wells. 10 Although the portion of the 
Wells opinion that discussed the consent search recognized that the "act 
of locking a container constitutes a manifest denial of consent to open it .. 
. and creates a legally recognized zone of privacy inside that container," 
the portion of the opinion discussing inventory searches focused upon 
closed-not locked-containers. Furthermore, Wells relied heavily on 
Bertine, and in Bertine the backpack that was inventoried was closed, not 
locked 
Roberson v. State, 566 So.2d 561, 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted) (original 
emphasis); see also Com. v. Muckle, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 678, 682 (Ct. App. 2004) 
("More problematic, and fatal to the search conducted here, is the absence of standard 
9 The containers at issue were not locked, but they were closed. At the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Miller testified that "[a]s soon as I opened the ... purse, I recognized 
that there were ... several syringes ... in the ... purse." (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-11 
(emphasis added).) Officer Miller also testified that "the dog also had a zipper on the 
back of it, and as I unzipped the - - the dog there [were] other syringes, miscellaneous 
papers and things in the back of that." (02/12/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-14. (emphasis 
added).) Officer Miller testified that he could not see any incriminating evidence until he 
opened the items at issue. Therefore, the record indicates that the items at issue were 
closed and Officer Miller opened them as part of the search. 
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written procedures requiring the police to open closed but unlocked containers when 
conducting an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.") Since there is no policy 
concerning the distinction between containers that are locked and containers that are 
closed yet unlocked, Officer Miller was without any guidance and had total discretion to 
decide to open the purse. Thus, there is no way of knowing if that decision was truly 
based on a desire to create an accurate inventory or to search for evidence of a crime. 
As argued above, the record contains evidence which indicates that Officer 
Miller's decision to search the vehicle was based on his desire to search for evidence of 
criminal activity. Officer Miller told Mr. McBride's mother that he wanted to search the 
vehicle because he thought it might contain drugs. (06/01/10 Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, 
L.5.) Therefore, there is evidence which indicates that the "inventory search" in this 
matter was, in reality, an investigatory search. 
In sum, Idaho Appellate Courts and the United State's Supreme Court both 
require an otherwise reasonable inventory to be governed by a specific set of 
preexisting standards to prevent an inventory search from turning into a ruse to avoid 
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The State never met its burden of 
providing the district court with credible evidence establishing the existence of these 
procedures. The district court made an implicit factual finding that those policies do not 
exist, but nevertheless ruled against Mr. McBride based on a theory that the 
requirement of standardized procedures is only applicable when police inventory the 
contents of locked containers. That conclusion is not supported by case law and for 
that reason the district court erred when it denied Mr. McBride's motion to suppress. 
10 The Wells opInIon referenced in the preceding quote was the Florida Supreme 
Court's opinion State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla.1989), which was affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. McBride requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction and sentence, reverse the district court's order denying his suppression 
motion, and remand that case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 2012. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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